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In the Supren1e Court
of the State of Utah
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Plaintiff and Ht'::'Ptllltknt,
JOH...\ \\'. S)llTH ..\~n .1. l'.:\_.2\lEHU.\
S1IITH. E. LlXl'I.JLX ~.\llTll. POLLY
SlliTH. JUHX \\". ~_JUTH "\~r~ .\L\X
G~\ILEY. Tru:'h't':' L)f tilt' Smith Laud
Company. and S)IITH L~-\XD CU.\fPA~1. a Corporation,
Defendants and ~\ppellant:3 .
..UBERT S. \YHEEL \YRIGHT, Tru:'tt'e
in Bankruptcy of John \Y. Smith,
Bankrupt. Intern~nor and Respondent,

No.6199

A....~D

S1IITH L_\XD CO)IP ~\XY, a Corporation.
Plaintiff and ~-\ppellant,

vs.
1I. )L .Johnson. ReceiYer of XielsonBurton Company, Formerly a Co-Partnership. Composed of ~-\ ..J. Xielson and
Charles S. Burton. f'H ..-\RLE~ D.
)IOORE. \\IL~E ..-\. XIELSOX,
Defendant~ anrl Re~pondPnt~.

1No.6198

\
I

Appeal From Fir:-:t Di~trict Court, Boxelcler County
Honora hlp Lester A. \Y adr>, .Juclg-r·

Petition for Rehearing, and Supporting Brief
.J. D. SKEEX,
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Attorneys for Appellants.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
W. A. NIELSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JOHN W. SM.ITH, AND J. CAMERON
SMITH, E. LINCOI.u.~ SMITH, POLLY
SMITH, JOHN ,v. SMITH AND MAX
GAILEY, Trustees of the Smith Land
.Company, and SMITH LAND COMpANY. a Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.
ALBERTS. 'VHEELWRIGHT, Trustee
in Bankruptcy of John W. Smith,
Bankrupt, Intervenor and Respondent,

No.6199

AND

SMITH Lk~D COMPANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
M. M. Johnson, Receiver of NielsonBurton Company, Formerly a Co-Partnership, Composed of A. J. Nielson and
Charles S. Burton, CHARLER D.
MOORE, WILSE A. NIELSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal From First District Court, Boxelder County
Honorable Lester A. Wade, Judge

Petition for Rehearing, and Supporting Brief
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Uome now the appellants in the above entitled cases,
consolidated for hearing herein, and petition for
rehearing herein, upon the following grounds, towit:
1.
i he Court has failed to consider facts which show

1 1

conclusively that predecessors in interest of :the
plaintiff 7 W. A. Nielson, in the Box Elder County
case had notice in 1930 of the assignment of the contract of purchase described in the complaint, and
that by reason thereof, this Court has erroneously
concluded that the cause of action sued upon was not
barred by the Statute of Limitations.

2.
The Court has erroneously held and concluded that
the notice of the transfer of the said contract of
]Jurchase, given to the sheriff of Box Elder County,
as agent of the plaintiff's predecessor in interest:
was not notice to hii-; principal.
3.
The Court has erroneously failed to apply to this
case the well established rule that the means of
knowleclg·e of a fraud is equivalent to knowledge.
4.
~This

Honorable Court erred in stating that
''There is considerable confli~;t as to
whether Nielson and his privies knew and
should have known of the assignment of the
contract to the corporation,''
for the reason that there is no conflict in the evidence whatsoever as to facts reasonably calculated
to give the judgment creditor notice of the assjgnment to·wit: the fact that the sheriff was instructed
to make a levy upon the property involved in this
suit, and that he did not make the levy because he
found that the property had bePn transferred by
W.LawSmith,
thefor digitization
judgment
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are shown bv d.ocmnentarv evidence - the records
of the sheriff's office.
..
5.
This Honorable Court erred in concluding that the
exact 1nethod and tune of noti<>e of modification of
the transfer are not alleged. It is well settled that
the plaintiff, in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, which is commenced more than three years
after the conveyance, must specificaily allege facts
which negative notice of the said conveyance, ·~·he
burden is not on the defendant, but is on the
plaintiff.

6.
The Court erred in awarding costs to the respondents.
J.D. SKEEN,
E. J. SKEEN,
Attorneys for Appellants.

Brief in Support of Petition for a
Rehearing
This petition is addressed to two issues :

L
The Court erred in holding that the cause
of action in the Box Elder County case was
not barred by the Statute cf Limitations,
and

2.
The Court erred in awarding costs
respondents.
The defense of the Statute of Limitations
missed by the Court with the statement:
''There is considerable conflict as
'vh.ether Nielson or his privies knew

to
is disto
or
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should have known ~f the assignment of
the contract to the Corporation. But the
exact method and time of notification are
not alleged. Conditions on the farm remained the same, that is, John W. Smith
and family continued to live on and to
operate said farm. We are, therefore, unable to say at what time Nielson or his
predecessor had, or should have had, notice
and we cannot hold the action barred hy
the Statute of Limitations.''
We feel that the Court has failed to consider undisputed documentary evidence which, as a matter
of law, charged the predecessor of the plaintiff
with notice of assignment of the contract. Unaer
date of August 16, 19.30, a few days less than five
years before the suit was brought, a praecipe for
execution was filed with the Clerk of the District
Court of Box Elder County in the case of Bertha
K. Skeen, the predecessor in interest of W. A.
Nielson, respondent. (B. E. 272; Ab. 112). At about
the same time, D. A. Skeen, attorney for the plaintiff, Bertha K. Skeen, in the same case, gave a
praecipe to the Sheriff of Box Elder County as
follows:
''TO THE SHERIFF OF BOX ELDER
COUNTY:
You will please proceed to levy upon any
property, ~ither real or personal, which
you may locate belonging to defendants in
Box Elder County, State of Utah, and
advertise the same for sale, pursuant to
the execution and levy as soon as you may
do so.
(Signed) D. A. Skeen,
Attorney for Plaintiff.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
The shel'iff made a 1·eturn dated December 3, 1930,
as follows:
"I, John H. Zundel, Sheriff of the County
of Box :bJlder, State of Utah, do hereby
certify and return, that I received the within and hereunto annexed writ of execution,
on the 26th day of September, 1930, and
that by virtue of the same, I have made demand upon the within named defendant,
John W. Smith, for the payment of the
within judgment, with interest and costs,
all as more fully appears in the within writ
of execution, the defendant stated then
and there if I would call J. D. Skeen he
would take care of the within judgment as
he had the money to pay said judgment.
I did take up the matter with J. D. Skeen,
and on or about the 7th day of November,
1930, I received a letter from said J. D.
Skeen; a copy of said letter is hereto attached and marked exhibit A and made a
part of this return.
I do further certify and return that I have
made due and diligent search and inquiry
within my jurisdiction and have been unfl hlP to find any property belonging to the
within named defendant, but what is mortg-ag-ed or exempt from execution, upon
which to levy in satisfaction of the within writ.
I therefore return the within writ un~atiPfied.

Dated at Brigham City, Utah, this 3rd day
of December, 1930 .
.JOHN H. ZUNDEL,
Sheriff of Box Elder County, Utah.

(B. E. 275; Ab. 114).

By .......... Deputy."
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Attached to the return as recited therein, was a
letter from J. D. Skeen to John H. Zundel, Sheriff,
as follows:
''Dear Sir:
John W. Smith has requested me to ad-vise you that he has no money or property
out of ·which the execution you hold against
him might be satisfied. The property he
occupied was sold on contract and title
reserved to both the land and the crops.
Any equity he might have had was sold
some time ago.
Respectfully,
J.D. SKEEN.''
(B. E. 274; Ab. 114).
Let us briefly review the facts. The plaintiff
alleged in paragraph 4 of his complaint ''that upon
the entry of said judgments, execution was issued
thereon and delivered to the Sheriff of Box Elder
County and said executions were duly returned by
the said Sheriff wholly unsatisfied . . . " (Ab. 2).
It was stipulated by the respondents that no execution was issued except the one upon which the above
return was made. (Ab. 101). The attorney who
caused the execution to he issued in 1930 also represented W. A. Nielson in the other two cases in
which judgments were rendered against John W.
Smith. (Ab. 52-53). The sheriff, by his deputy,
Joseph R. Olsen, served the execution hut was unable to find property belonging to the defendant.
He pn~pared a return stating- the facts and attached
thereto the letter from .T. D. Skeen. The return
hears the date December 3, 19~0. ( Ab. 115).
The facts stated above are not in conflict. There
is not a word of evidence to the contrary. In
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order to defeat the defense of the Statute of Limitations, the Court n1ust hold that under the~e circumstances the plaintiff and Bertha K. Skeen, his
predecessor, were under no duty to make inquiry.
It must hold that they had no means of knowing
the fact of the transfer. Here we have an attorney directing tl1e sheriff to make a levy upon the
property of the defendant, and we have a return
prepared which stated that the property the defendant was purchasing under contract had been sold
some time ago. It is reasonable to presume that
the attorney was advised, orally at least, that the
levy had not been made. The plaintiff paid the
sheriff for the service; and is it the ordinary thing
to cause issuance of execution and then wonder
for five years whether it had been served 1 Of
course it is not. It may be presumed that the attorney made inquiry and was told that the levy on execution was not made, because the equity in the
land evidenced bv the oontrnct Iiad been tr)ansferred. He did n~t deny that he had discussed the
matter with the sheriff. He simply did not recall!
(~<\b. 105).
The test as to what facts constitute such means
of knowledge as to be the equivalent thereof is well
stated in the Utah case.Jonns ~fining- Co. v. Cardiff ~lining· & ?Jill
Co., 56 Utah 449; 191 P. 426, as follows:
''In all sueh cases the statute begins to
run from the time the complaining party
discovered the wrongs complained of or
'when he ·was avprised of such facts and
circumstances with respect thereto as would
put a person of ordinary intelligence and
pnulence upon inquiry. The law is stated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to that effect by this Court in the ca;:;e of
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 248 ; 158 Pac.
426, and in Salt Lake City v. Investment
Co., 43 Utah 181 ; 134 Pac. 603. If therefore the facts and circumstances which
came to the knowledge of the plaintiff corporation were such as would have caused a
person of ordinary prudence and intelligence to act, then it should have acted, and
the statute of limitations was set in motion
as to it."

It is submitted that a "person of ordinary prudence
and intelligence'' would inquire of the sheriff as to
the reason for not making the levy, and would have
been in a position to know all of the facts. This
rule is based on sound reasoning. A person who
claims that he has been defrauded should be diligent in pursuing his remedies. Otherwise, equities
of third persons attach, evidence is lost and destroyed, witnesses die and proof becomes difficult.
As stated by the California Supreme Court,
" . . . A party who has the opportunity
of knowing the facts constituting the fraud
of which he complains; cannot be supine
and inactive, and afterwards allege a want
of knowledge that arose by reason of his
own laches or negligence.''
Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal., at p. 405;
38 P. at p. 42.
The respondent could have known all the facts if
he had said, ''Sheriff, what did you levy on in the
John W. Smith case'" HP would have learned
all about the transaction then. We think he knew
about
it inFunding
1930)
and provided
that byno
other
inference
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fron1 the evidence is reasonable. Vl e believe that
he stood by and remained inactive for a purpose.
If he had brought this suit in 1930 and had been
successful) he would have re<'overed only a contract for purchase, badly in arrears, and subject
to large tax delinquencies. That is the reason he
did not start the suit in 1930. Meanwhile Olsen,
the deputy sheriff died.
Unless this Court repudiates the fundamental rule
that knowledge gained by an agent in the course of
his duty i~ knowledg·e of his principal, the Court
must hold that as a matter of law, the Statute of
Limitations started to run in Deeember, 1930, and
the cause of action is barred. The ~heriff was em~
nloyed to make the levy and was the agent of the
judgment creditor. He knew of the transaction in
December, 1930.
The burden of alleging lack of notice is on the
plaintiff as is also the burden of proof of facts
which would excuse him from bringing the suit at
an earlier date. No such facts are alleged and
none proved. There is no claim that the defendant
concealed anythin~. The Court was in error when
it stated that the appellants had failed to allege
"the exact method and time of notification." The
burden was the other way.
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135; 25 L.
Ed. 807.
The facts discussed above are not even mentioned
in the opinion of this Court. We feel that in all
fairness this phase of the case should he reconsidered and a rehearing granted.
Although the Court has ordered modification of the
judgme-nt by reducing it approximately one-third,
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eosts are aBsessed against the appellant.
\Ve
realize that assessment _of costs is discretionary,
but believe that where a litigant is faced with a
judgment which is excessive to the extent of at
_least one-third (as found by this Court) costs should
not be assessed against him, if as in this case he
is successful in getting the judgment modified to
that extent. Judgment for costs should be for
appellant, or should be divided.
Respectfully submitted,

J.D. SKEEN,
E. J. SKEEN,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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